The paradox of transparency, short-termism and the institutionalisation of Australian capital markets by Nicholson, Gavin & Cook, Zoie
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
 
This is the submitted version of this article. Published as: 
 
Nicholson, Gavin J. and Cook, Zoie (2009) The paradox of 
transparency : short-termism and the institutionalisation of Australian 
capital markets. Australian Accounting Review, 19(4). pp. 303-313. 
© Copyright 2009 CPA Australia Ltd (CPA Australia). 
   1 
Gavin Nicholson & Zoie Cook 
 
THE PARADOX OF TRANSPARENCY, SHORT-TERMISM AND 
THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL 
MARKETS 
 
Correspondence 
Gavin Nicholson, School of Accountancy, Queensland University of 
Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, 4001, Queensland, Australia. Tel: 
+07 3138 9299; fax: 07 3138 9131; email: g.nicholson@qut.edu.au 
 
As the ultimate corporate decision-makers, directors directly impact the 
investment time horizons of the corporations they govern.  How directors 
make this decision has been profoundly impacted by the expansion of the 
investment chain and the increasing concentration of share ownership in 
institutional hands. By examining agency in light of legal theory, we 
highlight that the board is in fact sui generis and not an agent of 
shareholders. Consequently, transparency can lead to directors being 
“captured” by institutional investor objectives and timeframes, 
potentially to the detriment of the corporation as a whole.  The counter-
intuitive conclusion is that transparency may, under certain conditions, 
undermine good corporate governance and lead to excessive short-
termism.  
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Historically, shareholder value as the goal of the corporation has been 
paramount in the corporate governance research agenda and agency 
theory has been held as a central tenet. Both practitioner and academic 
publications alike highlight the importance of shareholders (and the 
issues surrounding them) to modern corporations. At the centre of this 
approach lies the relationship between shareholders and the board of 
directors, a topic described as underdeveloped (for example, see Daily, 
Dalton and Rajagopalan 2003) and overly narrow (see Daily, Dalton and 
Cannella 2003; Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Huse 2003). 
 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 
There has been long-held interest in the ownership structure of society’s 
major corporations by both practitioners and scholars (for example, see 
Monks 2001, Beatty 2001, Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2003). These 
studies have generally concluded that in industrialised nations, the 
modern corporation has evolved through three distinct phases: 
entrepreneurial capitalism,1 managerial capitalism2
                                                 
1 The first corporations were largely owned and controlled by entrepreneurs and their 
families who formed the basis of the emerging entrepreneurial capital system 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2003). 
 and institutional 
capitalism (Daily et al. 2003). As a result, under institutional capitalism 
the ownership structure of firms has shifted from a fragmented base of 
2 Managerial capitalism saw the ownership structure of corporations become more 
fragmented and an increase in the specialisation of labour, which led to the separation 
of ownership from control (see Berle and Means 1932). 
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diversified owners to a concentration of legal ownership in the hands of 
large institutional investors (Black 1992; Coffee 1993; Useem, Bowman, 
Jones, Myatt and Irvine 1993; Romano 2001). This concentration of 
ownership into the hands of institutional owners has profound 
implications for the control of corporations. 
 
LEGAL VS BENEFICIAL OWNER 
 
While there has been a concentration in legal ownership, institutional 
capitalism has also caused the beneficial ownership of shares to fragment 
further, largely as a result of often complex and opaque ownership 
structures. Retail investors (the beneficial owners) are generally far 
removed from the company in which their funds are invested, sometimes 
with several investment vehicles between them and the companies that 
make up their investment. As a result of this segregation, beneficial 
owners are unlikely to know in which company their capital is invested 
and therefore will not be in a position to exercise the traditional rights of 
a shareholder. In essence, the rights that accrue with shareholdings have 
passed from the beneficial owner to those who manage the investment. 
An example of this phenomenon is shown in Figure 1. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Figure 1 illustrates how in August 2003 a UK-based international 
financial services company, the Man Group, launched a capital guarantee 
fund, ‘Series 9 OM-IP 220 Limited’. This fund enabled the retail investor 
(the beneficial owner) to buy shares in the company Series 9 OM-IP 220 
Ltd. Series 9 OM-IP 220 Ltd then invested the money through three key 
methods: (1) a capital guarantee with Westpac Bank; (2) investment using 
Man’s proprietary AHL Diversified Program, which examines more than 
100 markets; and (3) investment in the Glenwood Multi-Strategy 
Program, which uses more than 90 of the world’s leading specialised 
international fund managers. Under such a scenario the retail investor (or 
beneficial shareholder) has no knowledge, let alone understanding of the 
companies in which she or he has invested. 
This pattern of investing has become widespread with the growth of the 
managed funds and superannuation industry. A review of the 
shareholding structure of Australia’s major institutions demonstrates a 
remarkably similar pattern of ownership. Table 1 shows the shareholding 
of ten major institutional investors (or legal shareholders) across 
Australia’s top 20 companies. These 20 companies represent more than 
60% of the market capitalisation in Australia. Table 1 vividly highlights 
that the weight of capital in the current system is controlled by the same 
legal owners who are often far removed from the beneficial owners. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
 
The shareholding structure of the modern corporation is fundamental to 
current thinking on corporate behaviour and decision-making. There is a 
rich tradition of work investigating this structure, particularly the 
problems that may occur when ownership is separated from control (for 
example, Smith 1776; Berle and Means 1932; Rutherford, Bucholtz and 
Brown 2007). 
 
In addressing the challenges of this separation of ownership from control, 
agency theory has been a central tenet with obvious appeal. Under agency 
theory, an agency relationship is created when one person delegates work 
to another (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This has clear parallels to the 
structure of the modern corporate form where shareholders are seen to 
delegate the running of the company to management. Consequently, the 
majority of academics examine this specific separation and the 
challenges, consequences and remedial actions it brings about (Daily et 
al. 2003). Similarly, from a normative perspective much advice, policy 
and regulation is also still being developed to address this separation (for 
example, ASX Corporate Governance Council 2007, Higgs 2003). 
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The increasingly concentrated legal ownership of listed companies has 
been seen as positive development in limiting agency costs. Recent 
empirical work (for example, Rutherford, Bucholtz and Brown 2007) has 
examined the expected reduction in agency costs while normative 
pronouncements (Zhang 2008) extol the virtues of an increased 
concentration of ownership. Further, the development of proxy voting 
advisory firms point to the possible positive impacts of an increasingly 
powerful shareholding group able to monitor and discipline management. 
 
Despite this development, critics have increasingly questioned the 
applicability of agency theory to boards of directors. This criticism results 
from the conflicting findings of a plethora of academic studies examining 
agency costs and controls and their applicability to boards of directors 
and corporate governance (for example, Rhodes, Rechner and 
Sundaramurthy 2000; Coles, McWilliams and Sen 2001; Deutsch 2005). 
The majority of criticism falls into two categories: (1) the assumption of 
unquestioning self-interested behaviour by agents (Donaldson 1990); and 
(2) the view that the interests of agent and principal can be clearly and 
simply summarised (Daily et al. 2003) in what are typically numerous, 
complex relationships between thousands of individuals. 
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Putting aside the questionable assumption of inherent managerial self-
interest (Donaldson and Davis 1991), the emerging institutional 
shareholding structure outlined earlier makes the second assumption (of 
singular principal interest) highly questionable. There are two reasons 
why a clear and unambiguous ‘principal interest’ is questionable, 
particularly from the view of the beneficial investor. First, each 
shareholder will have a different preference set for non-economic 
investment factors. Consider the ethical preferences of a particular 
investor (say, the construction of a highly polluting but legal 
manufacturing facility). A typical investor would normally follow a 
company’s operations and so would possess information surrounding the 
particular ethical issue. If the company fails to meet the ethical 
expectations of the particular individual investor (for example, the 
company builds the polluting plant), the investor would possess the 
relevant piece of information and would be in a position to exercise their 
shareholding rights, including exit. Under typical institutional 
arrangements, however, beneficial investors do not know the companies 
in which they have invested and so the potential ethical decisions of 
investing are ceded to the institutional owner. 
 
Second, many institutional products contain multiple investment vehicles 
(for example, see Figure 1). Under these circumstances it is entirely 
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possible that the position of one investment vehicle may conflict with the 
other. For instance, one investment fund takes a short position on a stock 
believing it will fall in value while another takes a long position believing 
it will rise. This is quite illogical in terms of the beneficial investor who, 
investing in a single fund, now holds the position of hoping the stock will 
simultaneously rise and fall.3
 
 
These examples highlight that the exercise of shareholder discretion, and 
therefore principal interest under an agency relationship, moves from the 
beneficial investor to the institutional investor. In what could only be 
considered an ironic outcome, the concentration of ownership in 
institutional investors can lead to higher, not lower agency costs. Where 
the motivations of institutional investors diverge from those of the 
beneficial owners, we will find a loss of utility for the beneficial investors 
as the institutional investors pursue their own aims. 
 
DEFINING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR INTEREST 
 
Despite serious implications, the divergent aims of institutional investors 
are not treated with the same alarm as that of divergent aims of 
                                                 
3 This is different from portfolio theory, where positions are held in non-correlated 
assets or stocks. Here, we are talking about investors holding different positions in the 
same stock. The logical actions for an investor to take are to net the two positions and 
take the consolidated position.  
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management. It is interesting to note that the average CEO salary of a 
Fortune 500 company in the US is 7% of the company’s turnover (Walsh 
2008). While CEO salaries can be considered extreme (they are reported 
at peaking at 150 times the median household income in 2001 (Kaplan 
2008)), they are dwarfed by fund managers’ remuneration. In 2005 the 
top 20 hedge funds managers in the US were paid a total of $8.6 billion – 
some 18% more than the pay of all CEOs in the entire Fortune 500 
(Kaplan 2008). 
 
Given the scale of the interests involved, it is reasonable to examine the 
practices of the institutional investment industry. Despite claims that 
equity investments are long term in their nature (typically seven years or 
more) (Peirson, Brown, Easton, Howard and Pinder 2006), institutional 
investors generally promote their products on annual, three-year, and at 
most five-year returns. Further, the typical remuneration package for 
investment managers concentrates on quarterly and/or annual returns (for 
example, see Donaldson 2003, Partnoy 2003). Given these pressures and 
the scale of motivation, it is clear that there is a significant likelihood that 
institutional investors may diverge from the long-term value creation 
position that lies at the heart of equity investing. 
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With the significant problems posed by both management and 
institutional investor self-interest, there needs to be another party in the 
investment chain that can safeguard the interests of the company as a 
whole. The board of directors is an obvious choice to act as this party as 
they already exist in the organisation and legally should act in the 
interests of the company as a whole, as discussed below. 
 
THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE SHAREHOLDER–MANAGER 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
The relationship between the principal and agent lies at the heart of 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Despite the importance of 
this relationship, governance scholars, particularly from the management 
tradition, have not taken into account the true nature of the legal 
principles that underlie the agency relationship they study (for a rare 
exception see Kaufman and Englander 2005). 
 
Board as sui generis 
 
Early legal theory posited that the shareholder–manager relationship 
largely mirrored that expected under agency theory. Directors and 
officers of corporations were considered to act purely in the interests of 
shareholders (Eisenberg 1969, Friedman 1970) and as such could be 
conceptualised as agents of the shareholders. This view has been 
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challenged by an alternative contractarian legal theory of the relationship 
(see Blair and Stout 1989; Bainbridge 2002, 2003). This alternative 
contraction view is based on Coase’s (1937) conception of the 
organisation as a nexus of contracts (Bainbridge 2003) and contends that 
shareholders are not owners, as they have no right to exercise control over 
the corporation. 
 
If we examine a firm from this perspective, we see that the contract 
between shareholders and other parties (particularly the directors) is quite 
limited. Shareholders do not hold the all-encompassing control role 
implied by the agency theory literature. Any ‘control’ powers of 
shareholders are limited to those contained in the relevant company’s 
constitution, with the most significant typically being the ability to 
appoint and remove directors.4
                                                 
4 We note that even this power is not universal. Some companies have other bodies 
(including the board of directors themselves) that have the power to appoint and 
remove directors. 
 Outside of these powers, shareholder 
influence is quite limited and would not be sufficient to be labelled 
‘control’ under a legal definition. It is the sole responsibility of the 
directors (not shareholders) to direct the corporation to undertake, or 
refrain from undertaking, any particular action; the shareholders do not 
have this power. For example, no matter how incompetent or egregious 
the actions of a CEO, shareholders cannot remove or appoint a new CEO 
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or discipline her or him by varying the remuneration package. This does 
not appear to reflect the principal position that agency theory suggests. 
Judicial decisions in many different common law systems further support 
the argument that shareholders are not controllers of organisations. For 
example, under US law, a sole shareholder would be subject to trespass 
and/or conversion actions if he or she attempted to deal with a 
corporation’s assets (for example, Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 
(N.Y.1918)). Similarly, the UK and Australian courts have all rejected the 
notion that there is an agency relationship between the shareholders and 
the management or directors of the corporation. Quite clearly there is no 
legal basis for ascribing an agency relationship to the shareholder–
management or shareholder–board link. 
 
In fact, directors (and managers) under most legal systems are required to 
act in the interests of the company as a whole (for example, Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) s. 181, Companies Act s. 172, Delaware Code Title 8 s. 
121), which is generally thought to include a consideration of the interests 
of shareholders as a group (Farrar 2005). So although the shareholders are 
not the principals in this agency relationship, they should still be 
considered when the directors or managers of the company are making a 
decision. This may seem a subtle distinction, but there are significant 
implications. Rather than the board being an agent of the shareholders, 
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the board is a separate or unique body – it is sui generis and serves the 
interests of the company as a whole. This idea has been reflected in much 
legal precedent; for example, the idea that ‘… the directors in the 
performance of their duty possess [the corporation’s property], and act in 
every way as if they owned it’ (Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 
(NY1918)). Instead of owning the corporation itself, shareholders only 
have a residual claim on the corporation’s earnings and assets (Blair and 
Stout 1989, Bainbridge 2003). Thus, it is not up to the board to simply 
carry out the bidding of the legal owners (that is, the institutional 
investors in our context), but rather to act in the interests of the company 
as a whole. 
 
To whom do the directors owe their duties? Acting in the interests of 
the company as a whole 
 
In the Australian context, the Corporations Act 2001 requires the 
directors and officers of a company to act in the interests of the company 
as a whole (ss 181 and 184). However, the definition of ‘company as a 
whole’, due to its non-specific nature, has been the subject of extensive 
debate. The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services, CLERP Bill 2003 (June 2004) concluded that 
[emphasis added]: 
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4.31 The committee considers that this interpretation [that is, 
shareholders’ interests being paramount], like the shareholders’ 
restrictive interpretation and the short-term interests interpretation, 
is too constrained. In addition, as noted above, the committee does 
not agree that acting in the best interests of the corporation and 
acting in the best interests of the shareholders inevitably amounts 
to the same thing. Consequently, the committee is not attracted to 
this interpretation. 
 
The Australian legislation that formed the basis of this investigation 
mirrors that of other countries; for example, in the UK’s Companies Act 
2006 and US’s Delaware Code Title 8. There is also much case law in 
common law countries which specifies that a director’s duties are owed to 
the company as a whole and not to individual members (for example, 
Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421). 
 
Thus, a key challenge for directors is to identify and act in the interests of 
the company as a whole, particularly if that interest were to conflict with 
the interests of a legal owner of shares. Since those running institutional 
investment vehicles are often rewarded on short-term performance results 
(Donaldson 2003), whereas the company’s (and beneficial shareholders’) 
interests are in long-term performance results, directors may face difficult 
decisions. This conundrum has, we contend, been intensifying given the 
increasingly influential lobbying power of institutional investors 
(particularly their capacity to influence director selection) and is 
examined in more depth in the following sections. 
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GOALS OF THE LEGAL OWNER AND DIRECTOR 
MOTIVATION 
 
A traditional agency theory of director motivation would imply that 
directors are faced with the choice of acting in the interests of a mythical 
‘average’ shareholder or acquiescing to management’s demands in order 
to serve the director’s self-interest. This choice is based on the 
assumption that directors are rational, self-interested human beings 
(Eisenhardt 1989), and therefore will undertake a cost–benefit analysis of 
the trade-off between enhancing their own wealth and power (through 
mechanisms such as entrenchment) and solely pursuing shareholder 
interest. 
 
Using this same logic, institutional investors with the ability to appoint 
and remove directors (through their shareholding powers) would (as 
rational utility-maximisers) consider the costs and benefits of influencing 
directors to act on the institutional investor’s behalf. Since institutional 
investors report and are often rewarded on a quarterly or annual basis, 
there is a strong incentive for those in key positions to pursue a short-
term focus. If they successfully influence directors, it would lead to short-
termism, where decisions made by directors increase the value of the 
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share capital in the short-term at the expense of long-term value creation, 
both for the corporation and the beneficial owner. 
 
Thus, the ownership structure brought about by institutional investing 
leads to directors facing three key options under agency theory, not the 
two generally acknowledged. Directors can act in their own interest (that 
is, not in the interests of any investors or the company as a whole), in the 
interest of the legal owners (institutional investors that are often short-
term in nature), or in the interest of the company as a whole (which we 
assume is long-term in nature and better aligned to the interests of 
beneficial owners). 
 
Our goal in the remainder of this paper is to generate reliable predictions 
about the behaviour of key actors – in particular directors – when making 
corporate governance decisions, through an understanding of the political 
elements of modern corporate governance. We also develop a model to 
explain the behaviour of the boards of directors. These powerful but 
straightforward tools would be helpful in characterising corporate 
governance behaviour. 
 
DEVELOPING A NEW MODEL 
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Thus far we have established that the notion of how and for whose benefit 
a director should act is itself an ambiguous concept. Even the simple aim 
of acting to maximise shareholder value, as suggested by many scholars 
(see Demsetz and Lehn 1985), brings with it many questions including, 
what time frame should directors consider? As the earlier institutional 
investor (i.e. OPM investments – see figure 1) example highlights, the 
legal owner of a single share and the beneficial owner may have differing 
preferences about the investment time frame. Legal investors (that is, 
institutional investors) may seek to maximise the returns over a short-
term period to maximise reporting and compensation benefits while 
beneficial investors (that is, retail investors) may seek to maximise the 
value of their share in the long run. 
 
This ambiguity highlights that any corporate governance model must 
account for the various motivations of governance actors, the key 
processes involved in aligning interests as well as the outcomes of 
decisions. Our model directly accounts for the motivations of the 
directors and investors (that is, what it is the various governance actors 
are attempting to maximise) and the effect of the review process 
necessary to ensure the alignment of interests. The model also directly 
examines decision outcomes (that is, the nature of decisions that directors 
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will make) under differing conditions of monitoring and director 
motivation. 
 
Through the model it can be seen that director motivation is a function of 
monitoring and slack (Levine and Forrence 1990). Slack has been used by 
organisation theorists to argue that it leads to an increase in a firm’s 
performance despite its costs (Cyert and March 1963, Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978, Thompson 1967), and by agency theorists to argue that it 
leads to a decrease in a firm’s performance due to agency problems 
(Fama 1980, Jensen and Meckling 1976). In this article the term ‘slack’ 
refers to where the directors have some discretion surrounding their 
decisions due to the lack of monitoring. By ‘slack’, we mean a situation 
where directors are shielded from monitoring when they take action or 
make decisions (Kalt and Zupan 1984). 
 
When there is no slack in the system, directors are forced to follow the 
interests of the legal investor (that is, institutional investor) or they will 
be removed from the board. When there is slack, however, there may be 
differing forms of motivation (Kalt and Zupan 1984). Directors may be 
motivated by: (1) trying to gain legal investor (that is, institutional 
investor) support for their governance role through being seen to act in 
the institutional investors’ interests; (2) garnering the support of some 
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other special interest group such as management for their own interest; or 
(3) acting in some other way unrelated to the directors’ own tenure or 
interests (that is, acting in the company’s best interests). This situation 
highlights that recognising a potential difference between company 
interest (long-term value) and institutional investor interest (short-term 
value) compounds the traditional agency cost focus on director or 
manager self-interest. We follow Levine and Forrence (1990) and divide 
the interests into two dimensions, private interest versus company interest 
and general versus specific interests. 
 
Private v. Company Interests 
 
Most economic theories, including agency theory, concern private 
interests. In our model, private interests refer to the self-interested 
behaviour of directors, mediated by the values and beliefs that directors 
use to govern the choices they make. Company interests are harder to 
define (for example, see our earlier discussion on the company as a 
whole). They are different from private interests, in that they require a 
degree of altruism – they are the interests of someone other than the 
director.  Thus, from directors perspectives, they only exist in the social 
context of the company. This occurs when directors fulfil their legal 
duties and act not in their own interests, but in the interests of the 
company as a whole. 
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Thus, directors constantly face a choice: make self-interested decisions or 
other-regarding decisions. Further, where the other-regarding decision is 
based on a self-interested motivation,5
 
 this is still a private interest under 
our definition. The key to this difference is in motivation – are directors 
motivated by self-interest or is their motivation other-regarding? 
General v. Specific Interests 
 
Directors’ decisions can also be classified as having either general or 
specific interest. A decision would be considered of general interest 
where, in the absence of transaction costs, it would be agreed that the 
action is in the interests of the company as a whole – it is in the general 
interests of the company. If the decision is not in the general interest of 
the company, then it would be classified as a special interest action as it 
would only benefit a niche subset of the company, which may not include 
any investors; for example, a decision may be made to satisfy external 
environmental pressure groups. 
 
Special interest actions require significant monitoring costs to exist in an 
organisation. The monitoring and transaction costs must be lower for the 
                                                 
5 For instance, where directors acquiesce to a legal owner preference even when not in the interests of 
the company as a whole in order to retain their position on the board 
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special interest group than for the rest of the investors/interested parties 
for the special action interest to occur. 
In the modern corporation, these conditions may often be the norm, 
particularly when we classify institutional investors and management 
itself as special interest groups. The organisational form and business 
environment allows the opportunity for directors and these two special 
interest groups to jointly exploit the slack (Kalt and Zupan 1984, pp. 282–
4) caused by the cost–benefit balance available to other governance 
participants. 
 
In essence, true monitoring of board decision-making is a costly exercise. 
Only those close to the process (for example, management) or with 
significant investments (for example, institutional investors) have 
sufficient motivation to monitor this activity. Other interested parties 
operate with a lower level of information – a situation that will lead to 
director discretion – particularly if the director acts in favour of a special 
interest group. Since directors are often rewarded for acting in favour of a 
special interest group, both parties benefit. Examples of the benefits 
flowing to directors after supporting special interest groups occur where a 
director accepts support for continued tenure, is offered additional or 
alternative employment or other benefits. 
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Slack in itself does not always lead to self-interested actions; however, 
where directors are sufficiently shielded from special interest monitoring, 
their actions may be Burkean in nature. That is, they may make a decision 
without expecting to gain personally from any source. With sufficient 
slack, directors can pursue an ideological agenda such as acting in the 
long-term interests of the company free from the pressures of special 
interest groups such as institutional investors. Burkean actions that 
directors can take include blocking popular courses of action that are in 
directors’ opinions ill advised, and using the complexity of issues to 
obscure unpopular decisions to further what directors believe to be the 
best interests of the company. 
In theory, the classification of directors’ actions seems straightforward, 
but in reality the classification’s boundaries become more blurred when 
applying it to theories such as agency theory. 
Table 2 highlights the interaction of the presence of special interest 
groups and directors’ actions. Panel A shows that with no slack (that is, 
no transaction costs or total transparency) directors will act in the 
interests of the company as a whole. This is because they are required to 
do so by law and, since there are zero monitoring costs, any deviation 
from this position will result in sanctions. 
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Table 2, Panel B indicates that with moderate slack and with a high 
presence of institutional investors, directors have no choice but to act 
with a short-term focus favouring the institutional investors, irrespective 
of whether they are other-regarding or self-interested. If they fail to do so, 
the institutional investors have the power to remove the director. Self-
interested directors are still constrained into acting in the interests of the 
institutional investors, as there is no discretion to act in their own 
interests (what we have termed personal fiat) as parties with sufficient 
inside information (for example, management) or sufficient investments 
(for example, legal owners) can expose such action. A long-term focus 
may be possible only where there is low institutional investment and 
directors are other-regarding as the lack of a unified voting block may 
free them from pressure to conform to the will of the majority. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Panel C of Table 2 highlights the norm with high slack (that is, where 
large monitoring costs are present). High slack allows directors to make 
decisions and take actions without being completely observable to 
institutional investors and other shareholders. If directors are self-
interested it will result in them making decisions that have some personal 
payoff, no matter whether there is pressure from institution investors or 
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not. Institutional investors may still be able to coerce directors into acting 
in their interests by ‘rewarding’ them in some way. This places directors 
in a weakened position, as now they must be coerced into acting in their 
interest, not pressured into it. On the other side, this absence of slack 
would also see non-self-interested directors taking a more long-term 
focus whether or not there is pressure from institutional investors or not. 
The next section integrates these three states of slack into a model. 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The model draws upon agency theory and modern political analysis to 
explain directors’ decision-making with the inclusion of slack and 
institutional investors. It highlights that, using agency theory, directors 
face a self-interested versus other-regarding trade-off. It also draws 
heavily on political analysis (see Downs 1957, Olson 1971, Fenno 1973). 
With the presence of institutional investors and in the absence of slack, 
directors (no matter what their preference) will be constrained to act in 
the institutional investors’ interests, leading to short-termism. The 
presence of slack allows directors to either pursue their own interests or 
act in the interests of the company as a whole. This will lead to either 
agency costs for the organisation or allow it long-term growth and wealth. 
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The key component of the model is slack. This lack of monitoring is 
caused by high monitoring costs. Therefore slack is more commonly a 
feature of large or complex organisations, or where there are unstable 
operating environments. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The first point to note in the model is that in the presence of total 
transparency (that is, the condition of no slack) directors are obliged to 
act in the interests of the company as a whole. Interested parties (that is, 
all stakeholders and shareholders) would have cost-free access to 
information to allow for monitoring of directors’ actions and decisions, 
leading to an obligation to act in the long-term interests of the company. 
Thus we propose that: 
 
Proposition 1: Under the condition of total transparency between 
the board of directors and shareholders, directors will act in the 
long-term interests of the company as a whole. 
 
As the model also demonstrates, where it is possible for a motivated 
group to monitor directors more easily than others (that is, in the presence 
of some, but not high slack) and where there is a motivated special 
interest group (in the case of the model, institutional investors), directors 
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are more likely to be ‘captured’. This capture occurs since the directors 
have no discretion in their decisions due to high visibility to the special 
interest group (that is, institutional shareholders) that occurs in the 
absence of high slack. 
 
Institutional investors often report and are rewarded on a more short-term 
basis, in some cases as short as quarterly. With pressure on them to make 
returns in the short term, they will often pressure boards to make 
decisions that will increase the stock price to create wealth quickly; this 
may be contrary to the long-term health and strategic direction of the 
organisation. 
 
Directors are not, however, easily subject to review by all interested 
parties (including minority shareholders and stakeholders) due to the 
presence of some monitoring slack. Further, as a result of the institutional 
investors’ short-term focus, directors’ actions and decisions will also 
become short term in their focus. Thus we propose that: 
 
Proposition 2: In the presence of moderate transparency between 
the board of directors and investors, directors will be subject to 
capture to the preferences of the special interest group and so will 
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focus on short-term outcomes where there are institutional 
investors. 
 
Institutional investors have this power over the board due to their large 
shareholdings in organisations, essentially making them the ‘voice’ of the 
shareholders. We would, therefore, expect the relationship between short-
termism and slack to be moderated by the concentration of institutional 
ownership. The higher the concentration of ownership, the greater the 
likelihood of capture and we therefore propose that: 
 
Proposition 3: An increase in institutional investment in an 
organisation leads to a greater likelihood of short-termism. 
 
In contrast, when there is high slack in an organisation the likelihood of 
directors acting in the short-term decreases. The actions and decisions of 
directors will now be more dependent on their internal locus on control. If 
directors are self-interested, they may act in their own interests. Because 
there is no pressure to conform to the requests of any special interest 
group (that is, institutional investors) there is no pressure to create short-
term gains. Instead, directors can approve excessive remuneration and 
perquisites for themselves. This can also lead to a situation where 
institutional investors, due to an inability to pressure directors, are forced 
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to use financial or other incentives to coerce directors to act in their 
interest. Thus we propose that: 
 
Proposition 4a: An increase in slack between the board and 
institutional investors leads to an increase in the likelihood of 
directors acting self-interestedly. 
 
However, the presence of slack also allows directors to act in the interest 
of the company as a whole by making decisions that will support long-
term growth and wealth creation. Freed from the scrutiny of institutional 
investors, a Burkean director can make decisions in the long-term 
interests of the company as a whole. Thus we propose that: 
 
Proposition 4b: An increase in slack between the board and 
institutional investors leads to an increase in the likelihood of 
directors taking a long-term view of wealth creation when making 
decisions. 
 
An interesting conclusion drawn from the model is that an increase in 
slack can lead to contrary effects; that is, slack can lead to directors 
pursuing personal fiat or acting in the long-term interests of the company 
as a whole. Research to date has focused on one particular aspect of the 
model – slack and a proposed relationship to self-interested behaviour. 
This has lead to a general belief that reducing slack, through mechanisms 
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such as increased transparency, will reduce the potential for director self-
interest. The model that we have developed shows that the opposite may 
also be true, reducing slack can lead to a reduction in Burkean actions, 
such as long-term investment horizons, stakeholder recognition and 
ethical behaviour. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We commenced by noting the dominance of agency theory in the 
corporate governance research agenda and the growing dissatisfaction 
with the narrowness of an agency approach. We have revisited the basis 
of the director–shareholder relationship and the ownership structure of the 
modern listed company to examine the applicability of agency theory. By 
combining agency theory and political motivation analysis we have 
modelled a more complete understanding of director decision-making. 
The model captures the impact of a new stakeholder (the institutional 
investor) on the corporate governance process. This has great potential 
benefit for academics and practitioners alike, through a new insight into 
why directors make the decisions they do. It also highlights that old ways 
of thinking, such as an increase in transparency leading to better board 
behaviour, may need to be revisited with the changing nature of the 
ownership of corporations. 
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Figure 1 Typical institutional investment vehicle 
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Figure 2 Short-termism model 
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Table 1 Ownership of the top 20 Australian companies as at 30 June 2007 
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National Australia 
Bank 5 3.82% 4 
3.52
% 6 
1.74
%   3 9.89%   7 
1.07
%       
20.0
4% 
BHP Billiton 1 
13.12
% 5 
3.70
%   3 
11.11
% 4 9.65% 
1
0 0.55% 7 
1.22
%   8 
1.14
% 9 0.62% 
41.1
1% 
Commonwealth Bank 4 6.15% 6 
2.51
% 7 
1.66
% 2 8.40%   1 8.42% 8 
1.20
% 9 
0.81
% 5 
2.63
% 
1
0 0.69% 
32.4
7% 
ANZ Banking 4 5.11% 5 
4.84
% 7 
2.19
%       8 
1.08
% 9 
0.99
% 6 
2.52
%   
16.7
3% 
Westpac Banking 
Group 4 6.60% 6 
3.02
% 7 
2.51
% 2 
11.81
% 3 9.86% 1 
15.10
% 9 
1.11
% 8 
1.13
% 5 
3.17
%   
54.3
1% 
Telstra 6 1.98% 7 
1.75
% 8 
0.81
% 5 4.60% 4 6.12%         9 0.65% 
15.9
1% 
Westfield Group 4 7.59%   8 
3.21
% 2 
15.79
% 3 
12.07
% 1 
20.70
%   9 
1.85
%     
61.2
1% 
AMP 4 5.09% 5 
1.90
% 6 
1.59
% 2 
13.82
% 3 7.17% 1 
15.84
% 7 
0.93
% 8 
0.93
%     
47.2
7% 
QBE Insurance Group 4 7.20% 5 
3.41
% 6 
2.74
% 2 
20.34
% 3 
14.78
%   8 
1.84
% 9 
1.05
%   
1
0 0.93% 
52.2
9% 
Woolworths 5 3.83% 4 
4.06
% 7 
1.11
% 2 
12.24
% 3 9.26% 1 
12.72
% 6 
1.52
% 8 
0.87
%     
45.6
1% 
St George Bank 4 1.41% 6 
1.27
% 7 
1.22
% 1 9.99% 3 4.77% 2 5.24% 9 
0.64
% 8 
0.65
% 5 
1.37
%   
26.5
6% 
Macquarie Bank 5 4.38% 4 
4.61
% 7 
1.67
% 1 
15.83
% 3 
13.19
% 2 
14.85
% 6 
2.07
% 
1
0 
1.12
%     
57.7
2% 
Coles Group 4 7.05% 7 
1.90
% 8 
1.34
% 2 8.30% 3 7.32% 5 6.98%       9 1.33% 
34.2
2% 
Suncorp-Metway 5 2.85% 6 
2.26
% 7 
1.73
% 2 
10.73
% 3 8.99% 1 
10.84
% 
1
0 
1.21
% 8 
1.23
% 4 
3.84
% 9 1.21% 
44.8
9% 
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Brambles 4 9.27% 5 
8.07
% 7 
2.29
% 2 
16.72
% 3 
12.53
%   8 
1.45
% 
1
0 
0.71
% 9 
0.76
%   
51.8
0% 
Qantas Airways 4 9.29% 5 
5.83
% 7 
3.70
% 3 
15.77
% 2 
16.08
% 1 
19.91
%   9 
1.37
% 6 
3.77
%   
75.7
2% 
Insurance Australia 
Group 5 4.54% 4 
3.38
% 7 
1.21
% 1 
14.01
% 3 6.73% 2 6.97% 8 
1.06
%   6 
1.46
%   
39.3
6% 
Wesfarmers 4 3.77% 5 
2.73
% 8 
0.71
% 3 4.48% 1 6.59% 2 5.03%     
1
0 
0.65
%   
23.9
6% 
Woodside Petroleum 6 2.27% 5 
3.81
% 
1
0 
0.60
% 2 9.45% 4 7.36% 3 8.57% 7 
0.76
% 9 
0.67
%     
33.4
9% 
Foster's Group 4 8.57% 5 
6.72
% 7 
2.52
% 2 
15.90
% 3 
12.48
% 1 
17.41
% 8 
1.17
%     9 0.92% 
65.6
9% 
* Various accounts amalgamated. 
# Nominee companies are companies formed by banks or other organisations that operate nominee accounts; that is, the holding of shares for the beneficial owner. 
NOTE: Table for demonstration purposes only, figures drawn from the top 20 annual reports. 
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Table 2 Interactions between directors’ actions and concentration of 
institutional investment 
Panel A: No Slack 
Context Self-interested 
director 
Other-regarding 
director 
High institutional 
investment 
Long-term focus 
 
Long-term focus 
Low institutional 
investment 
Long-term focus Long-term focus 
 
Panel B: Moderate Slack 
Context Self-interested 
director 
Other-regarding 
director 
High institutional 
investment 
Short-term focus 
 
Short-term focus 
Low institutional 
investment 
Majority shareholder 
focus 
Long-term focus 
 
Panel C: High Slack 
Context Self-interested 
director 
Other-regarding 
director 
High institutional 
investment 
Opportunistic 
personal fiat that 
may include short-
term focus 
Long-term focus 
Low institutional 
investment 
Opportunistic 
personal fiat that 
may include short-
term focus 
Long-term focus 
 
